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PRIVATIZATION IN EMERGING ECONOMIES:
AN AGENCY THEORY PERSPECTIVE
RAVI DHARWADKAR
GERARD GEORGE
PAMELA BRANDES
Syracuse University
The ineffectiveness of several privatized firms within emerging economies under-
scores the importance of agency theory issues and their impact on the privatization-
performance relationship. We argue that weak governance and limited protection oi
minority shareholders intensify traditional principal-agent problems (perquisite con-
sumption and entrenchment) and create unique agency problems (expropriation). We
suggest that postprivatization performance can be enhanced by using appropriate
ownership, management, and corporate structures that mitigate agency problems in
the context of weak governance, and we highlight avenues for research.
Many emerging economies recently have
launched ambitious efforts to privatize their
state-owned enterprises (SOEs), with the inten-
tion of replicating the success of these programs
in developed economies (Megginson, Nash, &
Van Randenborgh, 1994). The volume of privat-
ization has increased in emerging economies,
from $8 billion in 1990 to about $65 billion in 1997
(Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development ([OECD], 1998a). Nonetheless, re-
search shows mixed empirical evidence con-
cerning the success of such efforts (Frydman,
Gray, Hessel, & Rapaczynski, 1997; McDonald,
1993; Park, 1997; Wright, Hoskisson, Filatotchev,
& Buck, 1998). For example, Frydman and col-
leagues (1997) found that privatized firms out-
performed SOEs in the Czech Republic, Hun-
gary, and Poland. McDonald (1993) and Wright
and colleagues (1998), however, describe the ex-
periences of many Polish and Russian firms that
have failed to achieve efficiency after privatiza-
tion. Furthermore, Park (1997) found mixed sup-
port for privatization among fifteen Korean firms
(six firms increased efficiency, two had de-
creased economic performance, and the seven
remaining firms' performance did not change).
Privatization efforts in both developed and
emerging economies result in the transfer of
ownership from the state to new owners' and,
therefore, can create the agency problems of
managerial perquisite consumption (Gedajlovic
& Shapiro, 1998) and entrenchment (Walsh &
Seward, 1990). Perquisite consumption refers to
short-run cost-augmenting activities by manag-
ers designed to enhance nonsalary income or
provide other on-the-job consumption (Gedaj-
lovic & Shapiro, 1998). Entrenchment refers to
actions of management that reduce the effec-
tiveness of control mechanisms designed to reg-
ulate management behaviors (Walsh & Seward,
1990). We contend that the nature and severity of
agency problems in privatized firms in emerg-
ing economies differ from those in developed
economies and, in turn, limit the success of pri-
vatization efforts. The following quote illus-
trates the extent of agency problems in one
emerging economy:
. . . similar evidence comes from the oil industry,
where Russian companies were valued at under 5
cents per barrel of proven reserves, compared to
typical $4 to $5 valuations for Western oil firms.
An important element of this 99% discount is
surely the reality of government expropriation.
We thank the special issue editors, three anonymous AMR
reviewers, Phil Bobko, James W. Dean, Jr., Harold Doty. Tarun
Khanna, Ken Smith, and Michael Zuckerman {or their com-
ments on this manuscript.
' We recognize that an agency relationship might exist
prior to privatization. In this article we iocus on agency
problems that occur in the presence of new ownership struc-
tures. In typical analyses of agency costs in SOEs, research-
ers rely on the assertion that managers in SOEs focus on the
objectives of politicians, rather than maximize enterprise
efficiency. Therefore, critical agency problems relating to
SOEs have more to do with agency issues of political control
than with agency issues of managerial discretion and ex-
propriation, which are the focus of this article.
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regulation, and taxation. Poor management is
probably also part of the story. But, equally im-
portant seems to be the ability of managers of
Russian firms to divert both profits and assets to
themselves. The Russian evidence suggests that
an upper bound on agency costs in the regime of
minimal protection of investors is 99% of value
(Shleifer & Vishny, 1997).
Researchers suggest that agency problems
can be resolved through (1) optimizing risk-
bearing properties of principals and agents,
(2) increasing incentive alignment between
principals and agents, and (3) effective principal
monitoring of agents (Beatty & Zajac, 1994;
Boeker, 1992; Mallette & Fowler, 1992; Tosi, Katz,
& Gomez-Mejia, 1997; Zahra, 1996; Zahra &
Pearce, 1989; Zajac & Westphal, 1994). Such
agency solutions rely, however, on an efficient
governance context prevalent in most devel-
oped economies (HoU & Kyriazis, 1997; Kochhar,
1996). In fact, recent research highlights the
weak governance and underdeveloped institu-
tional context in emerging economies (Khanna
& Palepu, 1997; Peng & Heath, 1996). Traditional
agency solutions that mitigate agency problems
in the strong governance context of developed
economies might not necessarily be effective in
the weak governance context prevalent in
emerging economies.
In addition to traditional agency problems,
the weak governance context of emerging econ-
omies creates a unique set of agency concerns
relating to expropriation of minority sharehold-
ers (Cho, 1999). Expropriation occurs within the
weak governance context when large or major-
ity owners assume control of the firm and de-
prive minority owners the right to appropriate
returns on their investments (Morck, Shleifer, &
Vishny, 1988). Thus, traditional agency problems
based upon principal-agent goal incongruence
are supplanted by unique agency problems
arising from principal-principal goal incongru-
ence. Thus far, agency theorists offering solu-
tions in the developed economy context do not
consider this unique agency problem.
Our main purpose here is to address both tra-
ditional and unique agency problems in privat-
ized firms in emerging economies. Because pri-
vatization researchers have neglected the role
of agency relationships within the weak gover-
nance context of emerging economies, they have
ignored the ability of different ownership struc-
tures to resolve traditional (perquisite consump-
tion and entrenchment) and unique (expropria-
tion) agency problems. In response to the above,
we use management insights concerning the ef-
fectiveness of ownership structures in optimiz-
ing risk bearing, incentive alignment, and mon-
itoring and adapt these solutions to the weak
governance context in emerging economies.
Hence, our first research question: Which own-
ership structures will reduce traditional as well
as unique agency problems, thereby enhancing
privatized firm performance in emerging econo-
mies?
Researchers previously have examined the
implications of managerial, organizational, and
capital structures for resolving agency issues in
developed economies. Little research exists,
however, in which these solutions have been
explicitly considered in the weak governance
context of emerging economies. We argue that
effective governance mechanisms provide pri-
vatized firms in developed economies with a
wide variety of structural solutions that reduce
agency problems and provide incentives for
managerial risk taking (Gedajlovic & Shapiro,
1998; Gibbs, 1993; Walker & Vasconcellos, 1997).
In contrast, the weak governance context in
emerging economies limits the viability of such
solutions (Brom, 1999; Khanna & Palepu, 1997,
1999c). These structural constraints provide the
basis for our second research question: Which
management, organization, and capital struc-
tures will minimize traditional and unique
agency problems, thereby enhancing the perfor-
mance oi privatized firms in emerging econo-
mies?
The value of this research is twofold. First, we
integrate the management and privatization lit-
erature to highlight the inadequacy of agency
solutions derived in developed economies (such
as low ownership concentrations and manage-
rial ownership) to address traditional and
unique agency problems in emerging econo-
mies. We do this by examining various owner-
ship types and ownership concentrations in or-
der to identify which ownership structures best
reduce traditional agency problems in the weak
governance context. We find that ownership
structures necessary for resolving traditional
agency problems do not address the unique
agency problem of expropriation. Hence, we ex-
amine the expropriation potential of these own-
ership structures. In doing so, we suggest that
only certain majority ownership structures
652 Academy of Management Review
(those that minimize expropriation) can compen-
sate for deficient governance.
Second, we examine the implications of man-
agerial, organizational, and capital structures
in resolving agency problems. We argue that in
privatization research, scholars need to better
recognize that weak governance limits the
range and effectiveness of structural solutions.
Although this might be apparent to manage-
ment researchers, in little empirical research do
privatization researchers consider these issues.
For example, some organizational and capital
structures might operate differently across
strong and weak governance contexts. Previ-
ously, privatization researchers have seen the
privatization-performance relationship as a
black box process, without understanding the
implications of these structural solutions. We
believe that studying these structural solutions
could provide us with a more detailed picture of
why some privatization efforts succeed and oth-
ers fail. We begin by examining the implica-
tions of the governance context for agency prob-
lems in privatization.
AGENCY ISSUES IN PRIVATIZATION
During privatization, ownership is transferred
from the state to new owners, thereby creating
new agency relationships. Agency theorists
would argue that new owners must be con-
cerned with managerial perquisite consumption
and entrenchment problems (Eisenhardt, 1989;
Fama, 1980; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). In re-
sponse to these problems, new owners must in-
cur agency costs in monitoring the actions of
management or must use incentive alignment to
ensure goal congruence between principals and
agents (Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen & Meckling,
1976). Scholars also have recognized that effec-
tive governance mechanisms, such as boards of
directors (BODs), managerial labor markets, and
takeover threats, can resolve many agency prob-
lems, and they have grouped these mechanisms
into two categories: internal (i.e., organization-
based) and external (i.e., market-based) control
mechanisms (Boyd, 1994; Rediker & Seth, 1995;
Walsh & Seward, 1990).
Intemal Control Mechanisms
Internal control mechanisms include monitor-
ing by BODs and mutual monitoring by top man-
agement (Fama & Jensen, 1983a,b; Johnson,
Hoskisson, & Hitt, 1993; Walsh & Seward, 1990).
BODs can assist shareholders in evaluating
management performance and can control man-
agement perquisite consumption and entrench-
ment by adopting a range of short-term (e.g., by
using reward systems) and long-term (e.g., by
changing corporate structures) solutions (Gedaj-
lovic & Shapiro, 1998; Walsh & Seward, 1990;
Zahra & Pearce, 1989). Hence, when effective,
internal control mechanisms can resolve tradi-
tional agency problems. Typically, effective in-
ternal control mechanisms are associated with
the German-Japanese model of corporate gover-
nance, where shareholders can actively use
BODs to control management and where exter-
nal corporate control mechanisms (such as hos-
tile takeovers) are uncommon (Franks & Mayer,
1993; Prowse, 1994).
External Control Mechanisms
External control mechanisms include hostile
takeovers, leveraged buyouts, proxy contests,
and legal protection of minority shareholder
rights (Boyd, 1994; Walsh & Seward 1990). Exter-
nal control mechanisms cause firms to be sus-
ceptible to market interventions as incentives
are created for competent outsiders to take con-
trol of the firm when the firm is undervalued
(Davis & Stout, 1992; Manne, 1965). The effective-
ness of these mechanisms is facilitated by pub-
lic availability of transparent measures of firm
performance (Prowse, 1994). Therefore, when ef-
fective, external control mechanisms can also
reduce traditional agency problems by con-
straining executive behavior, since managers
can be replaced because of hostile takeovers
and mergers. Strong external control mecha-
nisms are associated with the Anglo-American
model of corporate governance, where share-
holders are comparatively passive with respect
to internal control mechanisms and instead rely
on external corporate control mechanisms (such
as hostile takeovers, proxy fights, and mergers;
Bhide, 1994).
Privatization and Agency Problems in
Developed and Emerging Economies
Internal and external governance mecha-
nisms can substitute for each other, suggesting
that either mechanism by itself can resolve
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agency problems (Rediker & Seth, 1995; Walsh &
Seward, 1990). This has important implications
for privatization. Privatization in developed
economies occurs in the context of one of the
following conditions: (1) effective (strong) inter-
nal governance, (2) effective external gover-
nance, or (3) effective internal and external gov-
ernance. In stark contrast, privatization in
emerging economies occurs in a context in
which both internal and external mechanisms
are weak (refer to Figure 1).
In order to highlight the implications of inter-
nal and external control mechanisms in devel-
oped economies, we use France (strong internal
governance), the United Kingdom (strong exter-
nal governance), and Canada (strong internal
and external governance) for purposes of illus-
tration. The privatization of Suez by the French
government to a solicited core group of fifteen
shareholders with 38 percent equity, the state
with 17.5 percent, and the rest with individual
investors represents privatization in the context
of strong internal governance (OECD, 1998b). Af-
ter privatization, the composition of Suez's board
is determined by the equity holding of the core
group of investors (the core shareholders and
the state) who can effectively monitor top man-
agement. Because of effective internal gover-
nance, shareholders can exercise control with-
out proxy fights or large equity holdings,
thereby minimizing principal-agent goal incon-
gruence. Thus, the privatization of Suez illus-
trates the ability of a core group of shareholders,
each with only 2 to 3 percent ownership, to ef-
fectively monitor and control management be-
havior.
The privatization of British Airways in the
United Kingdom (resulting in over 2.1 million
individual investors) represents privatization in
the context of strong external control mecha-
nisms. Consequently, the constraint on British
Airways' top management perquisite consump-
tion and entrenchment comes from disclosure
requirements, investor involvement, and debt. In
other words, in market-based economies like
that of the United Kingdom, substantial minority
ownership (5 to 20 percent) can provide stake-
holders with enough incentive to monitor man-
agement, as well as provide triggers to external
corporate control mechanisms.
Finally, the privatization of Petro-Canada ex-
emplifies transfer of ownership in the context of
strong internal and external governance. In
such instances traditional agency problems can
be resolved by either effective internal or exter-
nal mechanisms.
In contrast to these developed economy exam-
ples, Poland typifies many emerging economies
in which both internal and external governance
mechanisms are weak. Despite the fact that Po-
land has made more reform efforts in develop-
ing internal and external control mechanisms
than other emerging economies, a European
Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(EBRD) report (1998)^  relates the continued weak-
ness of governance structures within Poland.
Thus, the privatization of Krosno by the Polish
government (individual investors, 28 percent eq-
uity; employees, 12 percent; a local firm, 10 per-
cent; the Polish development bank, 15 percent;
and the state, 35 percent) has to be considered in
the context of weak internal and extemal gover-
nance. Specifically, internal governance mech-
anisms (such as BODs) cannot reduce tradi-
tional agency problems since they have little
influence over management decisions and top
management performance evaluation (in con-
trast to the Suez example). Developed econo-
mies that lack this strong internal governance
can use external governance as a substitute.
However, in Poland firms are not required to
send shareholder proxies prior to meetings and
thereby limit shareholder activism. Poland also
has small, illiquid capital markets and under-
^ Poland is an exemplar of an emerging economy typified
by both weak intemal and external governance. In the EBRD
report (1998) on transition economies, five point scales are
used to assess the country s relative strength of corporate
governance, banking reform, and securities markets devel-
opment. Even the most developed of these transition econo-
mies still average at the midpoint of the development indi-
ces, suggesting that few countries have achieved limited
success in corporate governance reform. The report indi-
cates that only nine (Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia,
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovak Republic, and
Slovenia) of these twenty-six countries have "made Bufii-
cient progress to promote corporate governance effectively
through privatization combined with tight credit and sub-
sidy policies and/or enforcement of bankruptcy legislation"
(EBRD, 1998: 26-27; emphasis added). In fact, only five coun-
tries (Slovenia, Poland, Hungary, Estonia, and the Czech
Republic) have made "substantial issuance of securities by
private enterprise, establishment of independent share reg-
istries, and some protection of minority stakeholders" (EBRD,
1998; 27; emphasis added). We surmise that governance
structures within other economies, therefore, are even more
problematic and that governance weaknesses of Poland can
be generalized to other emerging economies.
654 Academy of Management Review July
I
I
I
D -B
IIII
T3 O O "
I 5
o B a
e a
t!
a
01
s
0,
Q) (H c (D
Q XI H H
.3
0)
2:s
2
_5
II
c a
8
0 B)
C D
2
I
o
6
? 2
O 0
•O to
§ 2
O S
1
5 g
2 ^
Dl
a
o
8
mB
o
>- a
T3 &
C _0
0. *(D . a
n -o .jj
S .S g
3 « c 6 S
O "^  t3 0) >
S 6 Q c g
oi S pa S .5
o
u
S nII
o c
II
§
10
II
a 5 ?
S a o
2 - . B
II!
•rj C3 CO
ill
HI
3
0
M
c
Q}0)
0
"3
co
in
B
S
a.
>•
a
s>0
ID
2 tis
.^da
le:
2 c
I
I t3) 0
BO
u
a
O
IP
w d)
O o -'^
a u >.
6 S 2
I881I
CO CQ pa O D
0.
a
JS
T3
C
O
a
T3
ao
I
2000 Dhaiwadkai. George, and Brandes 6SS
developed bankruptcy mechanisms (EBRD,
1998). Thus, external corporate control mecha-
nisms (equity and debt) fail to resolve tradi-
tional agency problems (in contrast to the British
Airways example).
As in Poland, many other emerging economies
lack effective internal and external governance
mechanisms that can reduce traditional princi-
pal-agent problems (Carlin & Aghion, 1996;
Khanna & Palepu, 1997). In addition to these
problems, many of these economies have an
underdeveloped institutional infrastructure
with a lack of property rights-based legal sys-
tems that protect minority shareholders (La-
Porta, Lopez de Silanes, & Shleifer, 1998; Peng &
Heath, 1996; Williamson, 1991). Williamson (1991)
contends that enforcement of property rights is
key to effective governance. This has important
implications for the privatization process, since
it leads to a unique set of agency problems that
are not often encountered in privatization efforts
in developed economies. Specifically, in many
emerging economies privatization leads to ma-
jority ownership, where owners may use rela-
tives or friends as managers to mitigate tradi-
tional principal-agent problems through
reducing monitoring costs. These managers can
further the interests of majority owners by dis-
regarding the interests of minority owners.
Owners can also use interlocking ownership
structures (such as pyramid structures) to disre-
gard the interests of minority owners. Thus,
weak enforcement of property rights leads to a
unique set of problems in emerging economies.
The effect of weak governance coupled with
weak property rights enforcement led the presi-
dent of the World Bank to make the following
observation about some emerging economies:
Few recognized the profoundly corrosive effect
poor corporate governance standards have on
seemingly vibrant economies. The cost has been
enormous. In East Asia, two-thirds of Indonesian
and one-quarter of Thai companies appear insol-
vent. Cost estimates of financial sector restruc-
turing range from a low of 18% ol GDP in Indone-
sia to 30% in South Korea and Thailand
(Wolfensohn, 1998: 78).
Hence, we conclude that the absence of effective
governance mechanisms and poor enforcement
of property rights can accentuate traditional
agency problems while also creating unique
agency problems in newly privatized firms in
emerging economies.
MODEL DEVELOPMENT
Principals of privatized firms in developed
economies can resolve agency issues through
governance mechanisms, as illustrated in our
earlier examples. Consequently, in developed
economies postprivatization structures can in-
corporate characteristics of efficient ownership
structures prevalent in the private sector. How-
ever, principals of privatized firms in emerging
economies have limited recourse to governance,
face weak minority rights protection, and have
limited experience with efficient ownership pat-
terns from the private sector. In fact, privatiza-
tion results in a wide variety of ownership struc-
tures that can vary between and within national
boundaries^ (Frydman et al., 1997). Given the
plurality of these ownership structures, we
study the underlying dimensions of ownership
structures and assess their relative ability to
reduce traditional agency problems in the weak
governance context.
Postprivatization Ownership Structures in
Emerging Economies
In our review of the privatization literature, we
identified six basic ownership types that may
occur independently or in some combination—
namely, (1) foreign investors (e.g., multination-
als), (2) local institutional investors (e.g., banks),
(3) local individual investors (e.g., citizens).
^ For example, data on 682 privatized Russian firms
showed that the average ownership structure included em-
ployees (36.3 percent managers and 23.3 percent employees:
total, 59.6 percent), local blockholders (21.5 percent), the state
(14.7 percent), foreign blockholders (3.8 percent), and individ-
uals (0.4 percent; Djankov, 1999). In contrast, data from 705
privatized firms in the Czech Republic showed the average
ownership structure included local blockholders (non-bank-
sponsored investment funds, 30.9 percent; bank-sponsored
investment funds, 9.8 percent; and local strategic investors,
7.6 percent; total, 48.3 percent), foreign investors (2.4 percent),
and the rest individual investors (Claessens, Djankov, &
Pohl, 1996). One can also find substantial differences in
postprivatization ownership structures within a country. For
example, in Argentina the privatization of the electricity
generation and distribution firm Agua y Energia was done
with a transfer of nearly two-thirds of the shares to foreign
investors, whereas in the privatization of Caja Nacional de
Ahorro y Seguro, an Argentinean bank, 80 percent ownership
was transferred to a consortium of three local firms, 10 per-
cent was transferred to employees, and the remaining 30
percent was earmarked for sale in equity markets (OECD,
1996). . .. , ., . . ., ..
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(4) managers (e.g., top management), (5) employ-
ees (non top management employees), and
(6) the state (DeCastro & Uhlenbruck, 1997;
Djankov, 1998, 1999; Filatotchev, Hoskisson,
Buck, & Wright, 1996; Wright et al., 1998). We
categorize these six types as either outsiders
(owners not associated with the firm prior to
privatization) or insiders (those continuing their
involvement in the firm after privatization). Out-
siders include foreign, local institutional, and/or
local individual investors, whereas insiders in-
clude managers, employees, and/or the state.
We also group these patterns of ownership con-
centration into dominant and distributed owner-
ship. Dominant ownership refers to majority eq-
uity ownership, whereas distributed ownership
refers to the presence of multiple nonmajority
owners (refer to Table 1). By combining these
two dimensions (ownership type and ownership
concentration), we now can turn our attention to
answering our first research question on the
risk-bearing, incentive alignment, and monitoring
characteristics of postprivatization ownership
structures. Previously, management researchers
examined the effects of ownership type and con-
centration on firm performance in developed
economies. We re-examine their recommenda-
tions in light of the weak govemance context in
emerging economies (refer to Figure 2).
Outsider versus insider ownership. Scholars
have highlighted the importance of separating
the roles of owner and manager for the efficient
functioning of the firm, given the parties' differ-
ent risk preferences (Eisenhardt, 1989; Fama &
Jensen, 1983a,b). Eisenhardt (1989) suggests that
agents are risk averse because they are unable
to diversify their employment risk, whereas
principals are risk neutral because they can di-
versity their investments. Scholars have pro-
posed that incentive alignment mechanisms
that encourage managers to act in the interest of
owners can resolve principal-agent conflicts re-
TABLE 1
Postprivatization Ownership Structures in Emerging Economies As a Function of Ownership Type
and Ownership Concentration
Ownership Concentration
Ownership Type Dominant (Greater than 50 Percent Equity) Distributed (Multiple Minority Owners)
Outsiders
Foreign
Local institutional
Local individual
Insiders
Managers
Employees
State"
• There is one dominant outsider ownership
type that possesses equity controlling
interest.
• Within this ownership type equity is
concentrated in the hands of one entity.
Example: Gerber Foods Inc. bought 60 percent
of equity in Alima of Poland. This example
illustrates a dominant stakeholder class
(foreign firm) with concentrated holdings (60
percent).
There is one dominant insider ownership
type that possesses equity controlling
interest.
Within this ownership type equity may be
concentrated in the hands of several entities.
Example: The state retained 68.2 percent of
China Eastern Airlines: 31.8 percent was
divested to other investors.
• There are multiple outsider ownership types
that possess equity.
• Within each ownership type equity is
concentrated in the hands of one entity.
Example: For TelMex of Mexico, Grupo Carso
purchased 44.9 percent of the voting shares,
Southwestern Bell and France Telecom each
bought 24.5 percent, and the remaining 6.1
percent was held by fifty other investors. This
example illustrates three stakeholder classes
(local firm, local investors, and foreign firm)
with concentrated holdings.
• There are multiple insider ownership types
that possess equity.
• Within each ownership type equity is
distributed among several entities.
Example: For Agregat of Russia, managers
own 21 percent and employees own 48
percent post privatization. This example
illustrates many managers and many
employees (two stakeholder classes but
several individuals within each class).
° In the context of privatization, we categorize the state as an insider because of its prior ownership of the privatized firm.
Technically, the state may be classified as an outsider, but because of its long history of involvement, it displays the dynamics
oi cm insider.
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HGURE 2
Agency Theory Framework for Privatization in Emerging Economies
Management structures
Top management composition
Top management contracts
P2a, P2c
Ownership structures
Type
• Outsider
• Insider
Concentration
• Dominant
• Distributed
Pla,Plb,Plc
Corporate structures
• Organizational structures
• Capital structures
P2b, P2d
Firm performance
• Financial
• Operational
suiting from these different risk preferences. In
developed economies managerial ownership
(e.g., through stock options) is one such mecha-
nism for fostering incentive alignment and en-
couraging agent risk taking.
Empirical studies support the contention that
insider ownership (i.e., managerial ownership)
can be effective in the context of strong gover-
nance (Gibbs, 1993; Morck et al., 1988; Zahra,
1996). However, scholars also note that as the
managers' equity stake increases substantially,
entrenchment possibilities increase (Johnson et
al., 1993; Sundaramurthy, 1996). In other in-
stances (e.g., leveraged buyouts [LBOs]), insider
ownership may be efficient because of not only
the strong external governance but effective
debt mechanisms (Jensen, 1986; Oswald &
Jahera, 1991; Phan & Hill, 1995). In such cases
bank debt restrictions play a crucial role in mit-
igating agency problems by restricting free cash
flow and constraining managerial discretion
(Fox & Marcus, 1992; Long & Ravenscraft, 1993;
Phan & Hill, 1995). In summary, insider owner-
ship can be effective in the presence of strong
governance.
Managerial and/or employee ownership is
fairly common in many emerging economies
(Djankov, 1999). We contend that such insider
ownership can decrease risk taking and incen-
tive alignment owing to weak governance and
ineffective debt enforcement. Most managers
and employee owners in emerging economies
do not have a well-diversified wealth portfolio,
and in many instances their ownership is ac-
quired without any investment of personal
wealth or is received at a highly discounted
price (Djankov, 1998, 1999).
Most emerging economies have underdevel-
oped labor markets. Consequently, most man-
ager/employee owners have worked for only one
SOE that operated in a regulated economic en-
vironment and have limited exposure to market-
based practices. As a result, privatized firms
have few managers with the knowledge and
skills required to manage these enterprises in a
market economy (Stoever, 1996). Furthermore, in
most instances innovation and restructuring
have not been rewarded, and these employees
might be hesitant to perform these behaviors.
Hence, in emerging economies high levels of
Academy of Management Review
insider ownership are likely to be ineffective
because of agent risk aversion and lack of ex-
perience with free market practices. In other
words, manager/employee ownership may cre-
ate problems owing to management's incompe-
tent behaviors or misplaced efforts, resulting
from inexperience with market practices (Walsh
& Seward, 1990).
Moreover, these managers might increase en-
trenchment activities to avoid organizational re-
structuring activities that may displace them
and their colleagues (Djankov, 1998). In fact, the
weak governance context allows effective en-
trenchment because of managers' substantial
equity stakes (Barberis, Boycko, Shleifer, & Tsu-
kanova, 1996; Filatotchev et al., 1996; Wright et
al., 1998). For example, Shleifer and Vishny
(1997) note some entrenchment and expropria-
tion tactics used by Russian managers (e.g.,
threatening employee shareholders with layoffs
unless employees vote with management, fail-
ing to notify shareholders about annual meet-
ings, and preventing hostile shareholders from
voting). Finally, reports on emerging economies
underscore the inadequacy of debt and bank-
ruptcy mechanisms (EBRD, 1998). Consequently,
these mechanisms cannot mitigate agency
problems as they did in the case of insider own-
ership in developed economies.
In conclusion, insider ownership structures
(which are common in many emerging econo-
mies) raise numerous obstacles to restructuring,
owing to agent risk aversion, and do not provide
incentives for risk taking that further the inter-
ests of other outside owners (Frydman et al.,
1997; Wright et al., 1998). Our arguments suggest
that insider ownership is ineffective in address-
ing agency issues. Hence, we propose the fol-
lowing.
Proposition la: In emerging econo-
mies privatized firms with outsider
ownership structures will have better
performance than privatized firms
with insider ownership structures.
Dominant outsider versus distributed outsider
ownership. Since outsider ownership structures
are more efficient than insider ownership struc-
tures, we now turn our attention to the agency
problem of monitoring faced by outside owners.
Tosi and colleagues define monitoring as "ob-
servation of agent efforts or outcomes that is
accomplished through supervision, accounting
control, and other devices" (1997; 588). Numerous
scholars have suggested that effective monitor-
ing is a key to resolving principal-agent con-
flicts, since unsupervised managers can behave
opportunistically (Beatty & Zajac, 1994; Tosi et
al., 1997; Zajac & Westphal, 1994). Agency theo-
rists predict that in the absence of monitoring,
agents make risk-averse choices (Hoskisson &
Turk, 1990; Wright et al., 1998).
Researchers contend that high levels of owner-
ship concentration can lead to effective monitor-
ing (Berle & Means, 1932; Hill & Snell, 1989). Since
concentrated owners have higher stakes, the ben-
efits of monitoring and disciplining managers out-
weigh the costs that owners incur (Demsetz, 1983).
Higher ownership concentration is associated
with lower coordination costs, because there are
fewer owners with whom to coordinate and be-
cause of the significant voting power that can
limit managerial discretion (Boeker, 1992; Hill &
Snell, 1989). Additionally, high ownership concen-
tration can reduce information asymmetry be-
tween principals and agents, for concentrated
owners can demand information from manage-
ment (Hill & Snell, 1989). Specifically, investors
with significant equity stakes can use their voting
power, the threat to vote, or the threat to sell to
influence management (Hill & Snell, 1989). Dif-
fused ownership, however, leads to weaker mon-
itoring because of both higher coordination costs
incurred by shareholders and information asym-
metry, which make this coordination difficult
(Hoskisson & Turk, 1990; Tosi & Gomez-Mejia, 1994;
Williamson, 1975).
Empirical evidence from developed econo-
mies suggests that even low levels of concentra-
tion can effectively increase the market value of
the firm (Barclay & Holderness, 1991; Holderness
& Sheehan, 1988; Mikkelson & Ruback, 1991). In
developed economies low levels of ownership
concentration are effective owing to strong gov-
ernance mechanisms, as well as legal protec-
tion of minority shareholders (Bhide, 1994; Hold-
erness & Sheehan, 1988; Malitz, 1989; Slovin &
Sushka, 1997). For example, Holderness and
Sheehan (1988) found no differences in market
valuation and accounting measures between
firms with the presence of shareholders who
owned 50.1 to 95 percent, versus a matched sam-
ple where no one group owned more than 20
percent. In other words, investors in developed
economies can control firms by having minority
ownership stakes. In fact, management re-
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searchers often use 5 percent of a firm's out-
standing stock (in the hands of one individual or
organization) as a cutoff to indicate owner-
controlled firms or to signify the presence of
large blockholders (Gomez-Mejia, Tosi, 8f
Hinkin, 1987; Tosi & Gomez-Mejia, 1994; Zajac &
Westhphal, 1994). This suggests that even low
levels of ownership concentration can be effec-
tive in the context of strong governance.
Since most emerging economies offer limited
protection to minority shareholders, such low
concentrations (5 to 20 percent) cannot be effec-
tive in controlling agency problems. Hence, one
way to reduce agency problems is through the
use of dominant shareholdings (refer to Table 1).
In fact, we suggest that ownership concentration
can work effectively only when there is domi-
nant ownership (greater than 50 percent), cou-
pled with a working voting mechanism, for the
following reasons. First, as the number of minor-
ity shareholders increases, collective action be-
comes expensive because of higher coordina-
tion costs (McDonald, 1993). Second, the poor
availability of information, owing to the lack of
disclosure norms, as well as the absence of in-
termediaries who gather this information, com-
plicates the monitoring process for minority
shareholders (Khanna & Palepu, 1999a). Thus,
when ownership structures consist of numerous
minority shareholders, managers can easily in-
dulge in perquisite consumption and entrench-
ment. Nonetheless, dominant owners easily can
use their voting power or sell their stakes to
discipline management and incur minimal coor-
dination costs. Hence, only dominant, majority
ownership can replicate the effectiveness of
governance that results from low levels of mi-
nority shareholdings in developed economies.
Proposition lb: In emeiging econo-
mies piivatized fiims with dominant
outsider owneiship stiuctuies will
have bettei peifoimance than piivat-
ized films with distiibuted outsidei
owneiship stiuctuies.
Dominant outsider ownership and unique
agency issues. Thus far, our arguments have
focused on the traditional principal-agent rela-
tionship. We now move from the realm of prin-
cipal-agent concerns to problems arising from
principal-principal relationships, wherein dom-
inant owners can disregard the interests of mi-
nority owners. Expropriation occurs when firm
performance decreases because of individual
equity ownership, reaching a point where large
owners assume full control and use the firm to
generate private benefits at the expense of mi-
nority shareholders (Morck et al., 1988). In
emerging economies expropriation occurs
through the use of economic and social mecha-
nisms. Expropriation through economic mecha-
nisms occurs when owners use pyramidal own-
ership structures whereby they can achieve
greater control of the firm through interlocking
ownership (LaPorta et al., 1998). Expropriation
through social mechanisms occurs when large
owners use family members in top management
positions, and these managers then disregard
the interests of minority owners (Claessens,
Djankov, Phan, & Lang, in press). In both cases
dominant owners benefit at the expense of mi-
nority owners.
Empirical evidence suggests that expropria-
tion of minority equity owners is not a major
problem in developed economies because of ef-
fective governance and the existence of minority
shareholder protection (Bhide, 1994; Cho, 1999;
Holderness 8f Sheehan, 1988). However, LaPorta
and colleagues (1998) have documented the per-
vasiveness of pyramidal ownership structures
and the resultant expropriation in many emerg-
ing economies. Furthermore, Classens and col-
leagues (in press) have found that the majority
of firms in their study (2,980 firms, which account
for three-quarters of total market capitalization
in East Asia) are controlled by a single share-
holder. Also, most of these owners enhance their
control of the firm through the use of pyramid
schemes. Given the above, privatization efforts
in emerging economies that result in dominant
outsider ownership structures run the risk of ex-
propriation.
We have established that outsider ownership
and majority ownership are necessary condi-
tions for effective monitoring and incentive
alignment. We now explore the various domi-
nant outsider ownership structures in order to
identify those that will simultaneously minimize
expropriation while maximizing the benefits of
risk bearing/incentive alignment (Proposition
la) and monitoring (Proposition lb).
We consider the three dominant outsider own-
ership forms that exist in privatized firms (i.e.,
local individual investors, local institutional in-
vestors, and foreign investors; Khanna & Palepu,
1999a). First, local individual investors can re-
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duce traditional principal-agent problems by
using family relations/friends in key manage-
ment positions. These same appointments, how-
ever, can make minority shareholders suscepti-
ble to expropriation, since managers are likely
to disregard the interests of minority principals.
Local individual investors also can use inter-
locking ownership patterns that result in pyra-
mid structures to disregard the interests of mi-
nority principals. In both cases dominant
owners get more benefits from their ownership
than it is really worth. Given the preponderance
of expropriation problems in many emerging
economies, it is likely that privatized firms will
be exposed to these problems when they have
local dominant owners. Hence, we expect that
dominant local individual ownership can re-
solve monitoring and risk-bearing problems but
will aggravate expropriation.
Second, local institutional investors (such as
funds sponsored by domestic banks or indepen-
dent funds) also expose minority shareholders
to expropriation problems because of weak gov-
ernance and an underdeveloped financial infra-
structure. For example, Claessens et al. (in
press) have found that financial institutions
with large stakes in firms become concerned
with their own interests and disregard the inter-
ests of minority shareholders. Others have
pointed to the nexus between such institutional
owners and local individual owners that leads
to expropriation (Claessens, Djankov, & Lang,
1999; Wolfensohn, 1998). Scholars also have
questioned the monitoring and risk-bearing
abilities of these ownership structures in emerg-
ing economies (Khanna & Palepu, 1999a); first,
these owners are hampered in their monitoring
efforts because the information asymmetric con-
text within emerging economies, and second,
monitoring problems are further compounded
since these owners do not have the resources
and expertise to monitor their investments in
multiple firms simultaneously. In addition, insti-
tutional owners in emerging economies often
have business relationships with privatized
firms (such as banks and insurance companies)
and are susceptible to the influence of the firms'
managers, rendering them ineffective monitors
(Brickley, Lease, & Smith, 1988; David, Kochhar,
& Levitas, 1998). Thus, we suggest that local
institutional investors might make minority
shareholders susceptible to expropriation and
could have inefficient monitoring and risk-
bearing capabilities (Egerer, 1995).
Third and finally, foreign investors can reduce
expropriation problems and are less likely to
use economic and social expropriation mecha-
nisms. Foreign investors are likely to be under
greater government scrutiny than local firms,
which are already entrenched in the local polit-
ical and social environment. This scrutiny will
also discourage foreign investors from disre-
garding minority shareholder interests through
transfer pricing and profit repatriation
(Fraedrick & Bateman, 1996). Scholars have sug-
gested that foreign corporate investors' access
to governance expertise reduces monitoring
costs, owing to resource availability and previ-
ous experience (Djankov, 1998; Frydman et al.,
1997). In addition, such foreign investors as
multinational corporations or foreign bank-
sponsored funds are likely to have more diver-
sified portfolios of production facilities or in-
vestments compared to local blockholders,
making them less risk averse (Kim, Hwang, &
Burgers, 1993). In fact, empirical evidence sug-
gests that privatized firms owned by foreign in-
vestors outperform other outsider-dominated
firms (Carlin, van Reenen, & Wolfe, 1995; Egerer,
1995). Thus, we suggest that foreign ownership
structures are more likely to have the necessary
and sufficient properties in reducing both
agency problems in the weak governance con-
text. We propose the following.
Proposition lc: In emerging economies
privatized firms with dominant for-
eign ownership structures will mini-
mize both traditional and unique
agency problems and will have better
performance than those privatized firms
with dominant local individual or local
institutional ownership structures.
Postprivatization Management, Organizational,
and Capital Structures in Emerging Economies
Now that we have considered ownership is-
sues, we turn our attention to management, or-
ganizational, and capital structures that can op-
timize monitoring and incentive alignment,
thereby enhancing firm performance (Andrews
& Dowling, 1998; Eisenhardt, 1989; Wiseman &
Gomez-Mejia, 1998). Most newly privatized firms
have top management structures and perfor-
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mance contracts carried over from previous SOE
forms.^ Many managers of newly privatized
firms have not been exposed to market-based
competitive environments. As a result, they may
have good technical skills but lack other skills
essential to compete in a market economy.
Newly privatized firms often have organization-
al structures that are a product of the time of
their inception and subsequent structural iner-
tia (Stinchcombe, 1965).
According to Scott (1991), such structural fac-
ets may not be rational by decision but are
taken for granted as "the way things are done."
These organizational structures might have a
detrimental effect on postprivatization perfor-
mance, for they increase agents' entrenchment
potential by inhibiting effective monitoring. Fur-
thermore, these structures have developed in
the context of planned economies where mana-
gerial risk taking has been discouraged.
Finally, debt has not been an effective mecha-
nism for controlling management behavior be-
cause of state subsidies (in the case of defaults)
and connections between governments, banks,
and SOEs. In summary, we must consider the
management, organizational, and capital struc-
tures that are likely to reduce agency problems
in the weak governance context.
Postprivatization top management structures
and agency costs. Top management in SOEs
frequently is appointed by governments and,
therefore, has limited experience with free-
market practices (Garg 8f Handa, 1991). The top
management's lack of experience with market
practices can reduce organizational restructur-
ing efforts necessary for increasing firm perfor-
mance. In addition, scholars have often related
traditional agency problems, such as entrench-
ment, to top management tenure in organiza-
tions (Johnson et al., 1993; Tosi et al., 1997). If top
management of the firm remains unchanged af-
ter privatization, managers with long tenures
•* As one reviewer pointed out. there is some literature that
indicates preprivatization restructuring takes place in many
SOEs before they are put up for sale (Grosse & Yanes, 1998:
Walker & Vasconcellos, 1997). British Airways in the United
Kingdom and YPF in Argentina are cases in point. Clearly,
there is a tendency for governments to restructure "flagship"
firms in the economy to maximize privatization returns. We
recognize this possibility, but in most instances there is little
restructuring before privatization, since governments cannot
implement restructuring on a large scale with respect to
multiple medium-size firms.
are more likely to be concemed about their job
security and to initiate entrenchment efforts to
thwart restructuring. Several Polish, Russian,
and Chinese firms that continued to use their
preprivatization top managers after privatiza-
tion experienced more managerial entrench-
ment (McDonald, 1993; Xu & Wang, 1997).
Thus, continuity in top management from SOE
to privatized firm reduces the likelihood of or-
ganizational restructuring, since managers may
lack the skills or knowledge to introduce initia-
tives that enhance firm performance (Djankov,
1998). Barberis and associates (1996) found this
to be true in the Russian context, even when new
owners provided previous managers with equity
incentives; the managers avoided organization-
al restructuring despite having financial incen-
tives to do so. Claessens and Djankov (1999b),
however, found that appointing new top man-
agement led to improved profits and productiv-
ity, since managers with new skills could initi-
ate organizational restructuring, improving
efficiency. Based on the above, we conclude that
both new ownership and new top management
are needed for postprivatized firm success.
In addition to new top management, research-
ers suggest that continued government influ-
ence adversely affects postprivatized firm per-
formance (Spulber, 1997). This occurs because
government influence decreases the likelihood
of restructuring (Andrews &. Dowling, 1998). In
addition, continued government influence also
increases the possibility of expropriation of
other owners. After privatization the state often
continues to appoint key top managers, despite
owning only a minority stake in the firm.
For example, in China top SOE managers in-
teract extensively with local government and
party officials in deciding postprivatization top
management structures, such as candidates for
management, BODs, and supervisory committee
members (Xu & Wang, 1997). According to Xu
and Wang (1997), 80 percent of such firms end up
with an arrangement in which original manag-
ers and party officials keep important board and
committee positions in the privatized company.
Hence, no real restructuring is done, since board
members and officers are actually "insiders."
Furthermore, the pattern of membership among
boards reveals that membership is not propor-
tional to ownership: individual shareholders
may hold one-third of firm equity but control
less than 1 percent of board positions. Similarly,
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the state owns an average of 30 percent equity
in these companies yet represents over 50 per-
cent of board memberships (Xu & Wang, 1997).
This becomes problematic, for the state can
avoid restructuring (in order to preserve employ-
ment), despite its minority ownership in the firm.
Such situations are commonplace in many
emerging economies in which the state contin-
ues to play a significant role in postprivatization
ownership structures, despite having minority
equity ownership (Bornstein, 1994; Claessens &
Djankov, in press; Garg & Handa, 1991). Hence,
we suggest the following.
Proposition 2a: In emeiging econo-
mies piivatized fiims that continue to
have piepiivatization top manage-
ment and government lepiesentation
will have lowei fiim peifoimance
than those fiims with new top man-
agement and reduced government
lepiesentation.
Postprivatization organizational structures
and agency costs. The governance context has
important implications for the use of organiza-
tional structures to enhance monitoring effec-
tiveness (Eisenhardt, 1985; Wiseman & Gomez-
Mejia, 1998). Most SOEs have bureaucratic
organizational structures and a multitude of
rules concerning seniority, pensions, and sala-
ries that encourage conformity (Botelho & Addis,
1997; Merton, 1957). These institutionalized struc-
tures and practices can cause top managers to
be overly concerned with rules and regulations,
resulting in timidity, conservatism, and techni-
cism (Merton, 1957). Privatized firms that con-
tinue to use old SOE structures might be ineffec-
tive in monitoring managers' performance.
Therefore, organizational structures that pro-
vide opportunities to observe top management
behaviors will increase monitoring effective-
ness and will help identify an individual man-
ager's performance.
Scholars argue that multidivisional structures
(M-forms) allow for more efficient monitoring of
managerial discretionary behaviors and can
substitute for weak corporate control mecha-
nisms (Williamson, 1975). Essentially, M-form
structures help us to identify distinct business
contributions to privatized firm performance be-
cause of the decentralization of operating re-
sponsibility and centralization of strategic and
financial controls at the head office. However,
evidence from developed economies suggests
that M-form structures lead to market losses
stemming from least-cost behavior and short-
run orientations, resulting in decreased invest-
ment in research and development (Hoskisson &
Hitt, 1988; Hoskisson, Hitt, & Hill, 1991). Even
studies on the longitudinal effects of M-form
adoption have led scholars to conclude that
managerial risk taking is reduced (Hoskisson,
1987). In his original assertion on the efficiency
of M-forms, Williamson relied on external capi-
tal market failures and the re-creation of such
markets within the firm's boundaries. Since cap-
ital markets have become more efficient (e.g.,
Bhide, 1994), however, we surmise that the effi-
ciencies gained from adopting M-forms may
have become marginal in developed economies.
Scholars note that there might be substantial
differences in the emerging economy context,
owing to underdeveloped capital and labor mar-
kets that may actually enhance the effective-
ness of M-form structures as substitute mecha-
nisms for weak governance (Khanna & Palepu,
1997, 1999b,c). This might happen for two rea-
sons. First, M-form structures are more efficient
in promoting corporate entrepreneurship since
they negate the disadvantages of organization-
al size and complexity while facilitating moni-
toring of an individual manager's entrepreneur-
ial behavior (Jones & Butler, 1992). Second,
M-forms result in the more efficient use of inter-
nal and strategic controls since they create in-
ternal capital markets. These internal capital
markets can substitute for weak external capital
markets and can allow for more efficient alloca-
tions of resources and rewards (Hoskisson, Har-
rison, & Dubofsky, 1991). Given the above ration-
ale, M-forms may substitute for weak governance
in emerging economies by facilitating monitor-
ing and rewarding appropriate top manage-
ment behavior (Khanna & Palepu, 1997). Hence,
we propose the following.
Pioposition 2b: In emeiging economies
M-foim stiuctuies will be associated
with leduced agency costs and in-
cieased piivatized fiim peifoimance.
Postprivatization top management contracts
and agency costs. In order to reduce agency
costs, top management reward and control sys-
tems must encourage risk taking and bring
about incentive alignment (Barkema & Gomez-
Mejia, 1998; Govindrajan & Fisher, 1990; Hunt,
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1986; Tosi et al., 1997). Ouchi (1979) suggested
that two aspects of work can be monitored: be-
haviors and the outcomes that result from these
behaviors. Eisenhardt (1989) extended Ouchi's
typology, stating that both outcome and behav-
ior-based contracts can be used to align princi-
pal and agent interests. Eisenhardt (1989) rea-
soned that outcome and agent characteristics
influence the choice of contract. Specifically,
outcome uncertainty and risk aversion of agents
are positively related to the use of behavior-
based contracts, whereas outcome measurabil-
ity are negatively related to the use of behavior-
based contracts. In addition, the two types of
contracts have implications for management be-
haviors, since scholars suggest that outcome-
based contracts rely on financial controls,
whereas behavior-based contracts use strategic
controls (Hoskisson & Hitt, 1988). Developed
economies have relatively stable economic, po-
litical, and social conditions that assist in eval-
uating managerial performance. In addition, in
most developed economies information avail-
ability and benchmarks also assist in the eval-
uation process. Consequently, both outcome
and behavior-based contracts can be used to
align principal-agent interests.
Outcome uncertainty is higher within emerg-
ing markets because of unstable political, eco-
nomic, and social conditions (International Mon-
etary Fund [IMF], 1998; OECD, 1995). In many
emerging economies currencies have fluctuated
widely over the last few years, and many of
these economies have seen major political over-
hauls (IMF, 1998). Consequently, it is difficult to
accurately measure organizational outcomes
and evaluate managerial performance. Out-
come measurability is also problematic because
of the absence of clear benchmarks and stan-
dards for evaluating performance. Postprivat-
ization restructuring may take a long time to
complete and may produce soft outcomes, so
outcome measurability becomes problematic,
thereby complicating management evaluation
(Anderson, 1985).
Finally, given the underdeveloped labor mar-
kets of emerging economies, there is a shortage
of experienced managerial talent, as well as
limited information regarding labor market
structures and practices (Khanna & Palepu,
1997). Governments have made these labor mar-
kets imperfect by use of wage-setting mecha-
nisms, restriction of recruitment, and retrench-
ment. Within many of these firms, there is little
wage differentiation that reflects the actual de-
mand and supply characteristics of the top man-
agement labor market. Many top managers
within these economies have worked for one
firm their entire career and are very risk averse.
Hence, we conclude that the postprivatization
context in emerging economies is characterized
by high outcome uncertainty, low outcome mea-
surability, and high agent risk aversion. These
characteristics lead to imprecise performance
measurements, which, when coupled with man-
agerial risk aversion, provide a shield for man-
agerial entrenchment activities (Dyck, 1997).
Consequently, behavior-based contracts will be
more effective in eliciting appropriate strategic
decisions necessary for the dynamic context of
emerging economies and in influencing long-
term performance (Eisenhardt, 1989; Hoskisson &
Hitt, 1988). Therefore, we posit the following.
Proposition 2c; In emerging economies
behavior-based contracts will be more
effective than outcome-based con-
tracts in influencing privatized firm
performance.
Postprivatization capital structures and
agency costs. Agency theorists recognize that
debt incurs a fixed cost of capital (Jensen, 1986).
This fixed cost of capital plays a crucial role in
reducing agency costs by affecting manage-
ment's control and flexibility in making resource
allocation decisions (Barton & Gordon, 1987;
Gibbs, 1993; Kochhar, 1996; Williamson, 1988).
Specifically, in debt contracts borrowers get
funds from lenders and then make payments as
specified by contracts, which management may
consider as a limitation on strategic choice
(Modigliani & Miller, 1958). Thus, the resolution
of agency problems is attributed to reduction of
free cash flow and the transfer of some control
from the debtor to the lender in case of default
(Fox & Marcus, 1992; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997).
Empirical evidence from developed econo-
mies indicates that debt is effective in reducing
agency problems (Fox & Marcus, 1992; Gibbs,
1993). This reduction is attributed to the avail-
ability of information, incentives for creditors,
and an efficient legal framework for debt collec-
tions, all of which make debt an effective control
device. However, emerging economies lack
these requirements and, hence, are ineffective
in resolving agency problems (Baer & Gray,
Academy of Management Review
1995). Even in emerging economies with a pro-
liferation of bankruptcy laws, such laws are in-
terpreted in favor of managers, thereby aggra-
vating agency problems (EBRD, 1998; The
Economist, 1999; Tripathi & McBeth, 1998).
For example, in South Korea most bankrupt
firms carry on as before bankruptcy, often with
the same top management. In fact, the most pop-
ular bankruptcy route chosen by the majority of
bankrupt South Korean firms leaves the existing
management intact and allows the firm to defer
debts and interest payments while being given
new loans {The Economist, 1999). Currently, over
1,000 firms under South Korean bankruptcy court
protection are run by the very managers who
bankrupted them. In another instance. Altos
Homos, a Mexican SOE that was privatized in
1991, recently defaulted on $1.9 billion of debt
after the company's management continued to
be extravagant for 8 years (Wills, 1999).
Thus, in most cases agency problems cannot
be resolved by the transfer of control from debt-
ors to lenders (as illustrated by the Korean ex-
ample) or by restricting cash flow (as indicated
by the Mexican case). Therefore, debt in emerg-
ing economies has few consequences for its mis-
use, is ineffective in resolving traditional
agency problems, and encourages expropriation
of lenders. Based on the above arguments, we
posit the following.
Proposition 2d: In emerging econo-
mies privatized firms that have higher
levels of debt will have more tradi-
tional and unique agency problems
and lower firm performance than pri-
vatized firms with lower levels of debt.
DISCUSSION
Despite abundant research on both agency
theory and privatization, little work exists in
which scholars directly have addressed the is-
sues we raise in this article. We seek to extend
both agency theory and privatization research,
as well as integrate these approaches. Within
the agency theory domain, we relate different
ownership, top management, and capital struc-
tures of privatized firms in emerging economies
to the traditional agency problems of perquisite
consumption and entrenchment, as well as the
unique problem of expropriation, which hereto-
fore has not been explicitly recognized. In doing
so, we highlight that the solutions to agency
issues in developed economies are not a pana-
cea for those in the emerging economies. For
example, low ownership concentrations and
debt mechanisms can easily resolve agency
problems in the context of strong governance
and protection of minority shareholders. These
solutions, however, might not be feasible in the
weak governance context of emerging econo-
mies. In fact, the weak governance context re-
quires dominant outsider ownership structures
to resolve agency problems, and debt cannot
resolve agency problems. Thus, in this article
we clearly extend agency theory by (1) recogniz-
ing that agency problems are a function of gov-
ernance effectiveness, which varies across pri-
vatization contexts, and (2) deriving solutions for
agency problems that account for the weak gov-
ernance context of emerging economies.
Within the privatization research domain, we
explain differences in performance that are due
to agency costs associated with postprivatiza-
tion ownership structures in the weak gover-
nance context. By using agency theory insights,
we clarify the privatization-performance rela-
tionship by focusing on ownership, manage-
ment, and corporate structures that have been
largely ignored by privatization researchers. In
doing so, we highlight that privatization solu-
tions in developed economies might not be ef-
fective in emerging economies. Specifically, we
believe that the notion of postprivatization own-
ership has different connotations in the pres-
ence of weak governance, and privatization by
itself cannot enhance firm performance. Unless
policy makers and privatization researchers rec-
ognize the importance of management solutions
to agency problems in emerging economies, pri-
vatization efforts are unlikely to be fruitful.
Taken together, both agency theory research
and privatization research add to our under-
standing of privatization success and provide a
sound theoretical basis for exploring perfor-
mance differences in privatized firms.
IMPUCATIONS AND GUIDELINES FOR
FUTURE EMPIRICAL RESEARCH
Ownership and Expropriation
Since expropriation is not a major problem in
developed economies, in much of the research
on ownership in developed economies, re-
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searchers have focused on ownership of the firm
per se as the unit of analysis (Bethel & Liebes-
kind, 1993; Gomez-Mejia et al., 1987; Hill & Snell,
1989; Tosi &. Gomez-Mejia, 1994; Zajac & West-
phal, 1994). This operationalization neglects the
possibility of the principal-principal agency
problem of expropriation through the use of py-
ramidal structures, management appointments,
cross-ownerships, and use of shares with multi-
ple voting rights (Gomez-Mejia, Nufiez-Nickel, &
Gutierrez, 1999; Khanna & Palepu, in press; La-
Porta et al., 1998). Thus, it is essential for man-
agement researchers to identify and incorporate
the effects of both economic and social mecha-
nisms of expropriation.
From an economic perspective, this involves
identifying ultimate owners within pyramidal
ownership structures (LaPorta et al.. 1998). From
a social perspective, researchers need to focus
on the relational ties that dominant principals
have with their agents or other relational ties
that might engender crony capitalism and exac-
erbate expropriation problems (Gomez-Mejia et
al., 1999). Thus, the ability to collect data con-
cerning dominant owners and ultimate owner-
ship patterns, as well as dominant owners' re-
lationship to top management, will play an
important role in assessing the privatization-
performance relationship in many emerging
economies.
Strength of the Governance Context
One possible extension of the proposed
agency framework lies in studying the relative
strength of the governance context (Peng &
Heath, 1996). In previous research on privatiza-
tion, researchers have rarely considered the
relative progress made by various emerging
economies on governance and enterprise re-
structuring and securities market reform.
Progress in these areas can be assessed easily
through measures that classify progress made
by these economies (EBRD, 1998). For example,
"governance in enterprise restructuring" is as-
signed a value of one when an economy has
"lax credit and subsidy policies which in turn
weaken financial discipline at the enterprise
level and has conducted few other reforms to
promote corporate governance" (EBRD, 1998: 26).
The highest value on this five-point scale sug-
gests the economy has "standards and perfor-
mance typical of developed industrial econo-
mies with effective corporate control exercised
through domestic financial institutions and
markets, fostering market-driven restructuring"
(EBRD, 1998). Alternatively, one could also use
contextual variables (i.e., capital and labor mar-
ket variables) to measure the development of
the institutional context (Khanna & Palepu, in
press).
Based on the above, we could use our frame-
work to study the differential effects of owner-
ship patterns along such dimensions as gover-
nance strength or other contextual variables.
Our theory indicates that it is more likely that
dominant outsider ownership structures will be
better able to mobilize resources that enhance
postprivatization performance than distributed
ownership structures. An interesting empirical
question is to what extent would increased so-
phistication in an emerging economy's gover-
nance and enterprise restructuring efforts sub-
stitute for the critical role of dominant outsider
ownership?
Longitudinal Research
In future research scholars could also con-
sider longitudinal aspects of privatization and
its effects on performance. For example, do firms
that privatize gradually outperform those that
privatize more rapidly? What are the agency
implications of these two rates of privatization?
Walker and Vasconcellos (1997) have provided a
chronological view of the privatization process,
in which privatization leads to a transient pe-
riod before which a postprivatized firm operates
in equilibrium within the private sector. Accord-
ing to them, this period is temporary and occurs
after an enterprise's sale, when state control is
still reflected in the enterprise's operation. It
would be interesting to see whether our propo-
sitions concerning ownership, top management
structures and contracts, and capital structures
have implications for the duration of this period.
CONCLUSIONS
Privatization will continue to be an important
part of global economic restructuring. To fully
appreciate the privatization-performance rela-
tionship, however, we argue that it is essential
to consider not only the nature of the gover-
nance context but the implications of ownership,
top management, and corporate structures
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within this context. Privatization for the sake of
privatization can have disastrous effects. Many
global economic institutions (such as the World
Bank and the IMF) time and again have put
pressures to privatize SOEs in debt-ridden
emerging economies (Vernon, Wells, & Rangan,
1996). Similarly, many developed economies
have advocated privatization in emerging econ-
omies as a way to enhance the prosperity of
developing nations. Although these efforts
might be well intentioned, they are often ill ad-
vised, for many of the sources advocating pri-
vatization are not fully cognizant of the gover-
nance limitations within these economies
(Wolfensohn, 1998). By proposing an integrated
agency framework, we believe this article draws
together literature on privatization and chal-
lenges the notion that privatization per se re-
sults in better performance.
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